When Second Opinions Hurt: a Model of Expert Advice under Career Concerns by Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
When Second Opinions Hurt: a Model of
Expert Advice under Career Concerns
Yaozhou Franklin Liu and Amal Sanyal
Department of Economics, the University of Sydney, Faculty of
Commerce, Lincoln University
6. December 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36084/
MPRA Paper No. 36084, posted 20. January 2012 13:27 UTC
When Second Opinions Hurt: A Model of Expert Advice under
Career Concerns
Yaozhou Franklin Liu∗,a,1, Amal Sanyalb
aSchool of Economics, University of Sydney, Australia at Merewether Building The University of
Sydney NSW 2006 Australia
bFaculty of Commerce, Lincoln University at Lincoln 7647 Christchurch New Zealand
Abstract
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action
initially started on the advice of an expert if she gets an unfavorable interim news. But if
the status quo is reinstated, the principal is unable to verify the true state of the world. In
the model, experts want to appear smart and we find that the possibility of canceling the
action encourages less well informed experts to recommend it more often. We then show
that gaining access to an interim news as well as improving the quality of an existing one
can both reduce the principal’s welfare. The model implies that delegating the decision
rights to another person with different preferences can be used as a commitment device
by the principal and might improve her welfare.
Key words: career concerns, reputational cheap-talk, signaling game
JEL-Classification: D82, D83
1. Introduction
People often seek expert advice when making important decisions. It is also common
that after the initial decision, there is a period of time in which people can revise and
change their course of action. Within this period, a second opinion or interim information
that can probabilistically indicate if the initial decision was right is generally considered
useful. For example, governments often choose to “phase-in” important reforms so that
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they have the option to scrap the project if the interim feedback is sufficiently negative.
This paper asks whether such “second opinion” is indeed necessarily valuable for the
principal.
We will use a stylized example to illustrate the model, although the findings are
generalizable to other contexts. Consider a government/principal (she) who first seeks
expert advice to decide between implementing a reform and maintaining the status quo.
The expert’s (he) information, however, may be noisy. In addition, the expert wants to
appear capable due to concerns like earning higher future wage or enhancing his social
status etc. Because of these career concerns, he may have an incentive to distort his rec-
ommendation. Although the principal might start the reform after consulting the expert,
she could have lingering doubts about its appropriateness. If she can access an interim
news (possibly imperfect) about the merits of the reform from some other sources, she
can revert back to the status quo if the news is unfavorable. Generally such interim news
is available to a government from the media, opinion polls, feedback from political parties
and constituencies or from the government’s own research/information institutions. We
will first study the effect of the interim news on the expert’s recommendation strategy
and then investigate its overall effect on the principal’s welfare.
An important feature of the environment modeled here is that if the status quo is
chosen, the principal does not get to know the true state of the world– i.e. whether
it is appropriate for the action/ reform. The choice of the reform alone can produce
deterministic knowledge of the true state. This also means that the principal cannot
accurately evaluate the expert if she chooses the status quo. For example, a government
is unable to learn if oil reserve exists at a certain site without pilot drilling, or if a
reported address is indeed a hide-out for terrorists without raiding it. In both examples
the advice of the expert or informer would remain untested without the corresponding
action. Several studies (see below) have shown that if the status quo is less informative
than the action, then the less informed experts tend to recommend the status quo more
often. We extend the scope of the models of this genre by exploring the effect of an
interim news available sometime between the initiation of the reform and its eventual
outcome. While this opens up potential benefit for the principal, it also leads to change
of recommendation strategy by experts in the first place. A less informed expert would
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want to take advantage of the fact that if the principal goes back to the status quo, she
would have less information when evaluating his quality. One of our results shows that in
situations where the principal’s equilibrium behavior is to discontinue the reform when
the interim news is unfavorable, less informed experts would recommend the reform more
often at the initial consultation stage.
Given that the expert’s strategy is affected, the overall effect of the interim news
on the principal’s payoff can be ambiguous. In the central result (Proposition 4) of the
paper, we claim that interim news that is not very precise can hurt the principal when
the information of less informed experts is also of poor quality. In this situation, the
principal would be better off if she can credibly commit not to receive any interim news
at all. In a related inquiry, we take the existence of the interim news as given and assume
that it is sufficiently good so that the principal would act according to it. We then ask
if her payoff would necessarily increase with the precision of that news. We show that
the answer is ambiguous as it depends on the quality of information of the less informed
among the expert community. Better interim news reduces these experts’ incentive to
make pro-reform recommendations; but this is not always a blessing for the principal.
It may go against the principal’s interest if the less informed experts’ information is not
too noisy. Hence there are instances where the principal would be worse off with more
precise (even perfect) interim news.
These questions are relevant only if it is within the principal’s control to avail or
not avail an interim news, and if it can control the quality of that news. As example,
when a government decides whether to set up an independent monitoring committee to
monitor the progress of the reform, it decides between having and not having an interim
news. At this stage it can also control the quality of the potential feedback from this
source of news. In many other situations, however, the existence and the quality of
the interim news is outside her control, e.g. when it arises in the open through the
media and the political process. We will show that in these scenarios, the principal can
improve her welfare by delegating the decision rights to another decision-maker whose
preference is “publicly” known to be different from hers. Typical delegates in these cases
are persons known as significantly pro-reform or against it as the case may be. This
signals a pre-commitment to a particular course of action following the interim news
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and thus affects the strategy of the less informed experts. Officials selected in charge
of a reform sometimes appear surprisingly rigid or dogmatic when persisting with it in
the face of what publicly appears as unfavorable news. In some other cases, the officials
might be seen to be too fickle, swaying with the wind as it were and abandoning a reform
mid-way. Our model suggests that in some of these cases the principal effectively pre-
commits to a particular reaction to the interim news and thus is able to avoid (resp.
exploit) its detrimental (resp. beneficial) strategic effect.
The paper is organized as follows. We will discuss the relevant literature in the rest
of this section. In section 2 we set out the assumptions and structure of the main model
and develop the necessary notations. Section 3 contains the characterization of equilibria.
Section 4 investigates the central welfare questions of the paper. There we first analyze
whether gaining access to the interim news improves the principal’s welfare and then
the effect of improved precision of the interim news. We then analyze the possibility of
delegation. Section 5 discusses the role of the characteristic assumptions of the model,
and some other modeling choices. Here we also discuss the robustness of the paper’s
conclusions with respect to these choices. Section 6 concludes the paper by summing up
its contributions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related Literature
Our paper shares a number of assumptions and questions with the literature on
career concerns. Following the work of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), a number of papers
modeled career concerns by assuming that experts try to convince people that they have
accurate information by using (possibly) distorted reports.2 Career concerns take this
form in our paper, too3. Secondly, our assumption that the choice of status quo shuts
2Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a and 2006b) investigate the expert’s (mis-)reporting incentives in
very generalized settings. Visser and Swank (2007) and Levy (2007) have multiple-expert models and
investigate their behavior as well as the welfare implication of different voting rules. In Effinger and
Polborn (2001) experts deliberately choose to disagree with their colleagues in order to fool the market
into believing that they are possibly smarter than others.
3Assuming that the expert wants to appear well informed is not the only way that career concern
has been modeled. Holmstrom (1999) assumes that the agent wants to impress people with his level of
productivity. Some works assume that the expert wants to establish a reputation of being “good” or
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out the possibility of learning is a crucial assumption in several earlier works. Suurmond
et al (2004), Song and Thakor (2006), and Fu and Li (2010) use it to show, among
other things, that less informed experts have a bias towards the choice of the status quo.
Experts in our paper know their own types and that is private information. Levy (2004
and 2005) models experts with similar private information. Due to signalling incentives,
experts with low information quality in Levy’s models are shown to excessively contradict
the ‘conventional wisdom’. Prat’s (2005) paper asks, like us but in a different model,
whether having more information is beneficial to the principal. It finds that being able to
observe the actual action taken by the expert instead of just its consequences can harm
the principal because the expert has an incentive to conform to actions that appear
smarter.
While these are the overlapping features, our paper departs from the literature as the
inquiry takes us to a combination of features, which, to the best of our knowledge, has
been scarcely explored. First, we have a two-stage model. The expert’s recommendation
strategy in the first stage and the principal’s reaction to the interim news in the second
are mutually dependent. Since the state remains unobserved if the principal goes back
to the status quo, her choice after the interim news has serious effect on the expert’s
reporting incentive and this is one of the elements driving our results. Second, in our
model, the expert who has reputational concerns is separate from the decision-maker who
makes the project choices. The effects of the two stage structure on behavior would be
mostly lost if the expert also happened to be the decision-maker. For example, a paper by
Majumdar and Mukand (2004) has a multi-stage model like ours but the decision-maker
and the expert are not two separate actors. One of the main problems investigated in
their model is the persistence of inefficient policies, whereas in our paper the principal
can be harmed by the interim news if she cannot commit to persisting with the reform
to the end.
Two very recent studies share some similar features with our paper. Liu (2011) in-
vestigates a symmetric information setting where the principal might receive information
from several sources simultaneously and can communicate with the expert about this in-
“honest”, eg. Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001).
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formation. A crucial difference between that paper and ours is that in our case the expert
is able to completely block the principal’s learning if he can convince her not to initiate
the reform in the first period. We will defer further discussion of simultaneous reporting
and symmetric information to sections 5.2 and 5.3. Felgenhauer and Schulte (2011)4
has a model that partly resembles the first stage in our model setting. The principal in
their model gets preliminary information about a potential project. She then pre-selects
whether to pass it to the expert who would advise for or against its implementation.
Since the outcome of the pre-selection changes the expert’s belief about the project, the
focus of the study is how social welfare is affected by the quality of pre-selection. Our
study can be seen as complementary in a sense as our focus is exactly the opposite:
we study the welfare effect of the second opinion that comes after the initiation of the
project5.
2. The Model
2.1. Timing and Payoffs
The principal/government considers an action/reform. In state of the world ω = 1,
the reform would succeed and the principal would get the return YR = 1. In state
ω = 0, the reform fails and the return is YR = −c (c > 0). Alternatively, the principal
may maintain the status quo, in which the return is independent of the states and is
normalized to YS = 0. In the main model, we assume that the common prior is that both
states are equally likely. The principal takes advice from an expert, who gets a private
signal s ∈ {0, 1}. The expert is either better informed (i = H) or less informed (i = L).
An H-type expert gets perfect information about the state so that Pr(s = ω|H) = 1.
An L-type expert’s information is noisy and 1 > Pr(s = ω|L) = p > 12 . An expert alone
knows his type; but it is common knowledge that a proportion r ∈ (0, 1) of all experts
are of H-type.
4We are grateful to the referee who directed us to this paper.
5Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) and Li (2007) also have multiple rounds of communication. However,
in their settings, the first signal is always transmitted truthfully, and they are interested in how subsequent
messages are distorted. Again, we do exactly the opposite. We assume the interim news is truthfully
transmitted but focus on its effect on the first message sent by the expert.
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The game extends over two periods, T = 1, 2. At T = 1, the principal first consults
the expert. The expert gives her a message from m ∈ {0, 1}. Let ti : {0, 1} → [0, 1]
denote the i -type expert’s strategy, which is the probability that he reports m = 1 when
his signal is s. For expositional convenience, we will use tis to denote this probability
when the i-type expert gets signal s.6 Upon receiving the expert’s message, the principal
decides whether to initiate the reform. Let αm denote the principal’s posterior belief that
ω = 1 after the message m. If she keeps to the status quo, no more action or information
is available and the game ends with the return YS = 0. On the other hand, if she starts
the reform, she has to pay a non-refundable initiation cost k ∈ (0, 1). It takes a while
for the outcome of the reform to be realized. Conditional on the initiation of the reform,
the principal will receive an interim news n ∈ {g, b} about the prospect of the reform at
T = 2. If the state is ω = 0 (so that the reform will fail), the interim news is always
b (bad), so that Pr(n = g|ω = 0) = 0. On the other hand, if ω = 1, the interim news
will be g (good) with probability β ∈ [0, 1], i.e., Pr(n = g|ω = 1) = β.7 On getting the
interim news, the principal can choose to persist with the reform or revert back to the
status quo. If she persists with the reform, her return depends on the true state of the
world. If she reverts back to the status quo, she gets YS = 0. We summarize the timing
here:
1. At T = 1, the expert sees a signal s and his own type. He sends a message m to
the principal.
2. The principal chooses between the status quo and the reform. If the reform is
chosen, she pays a non-refundable initiation cost k. The game ends if the status
quo is chosen.
6We could instead assume a richer message space like in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a and 2006b).
However, even in the more generalized setting, we can still model the expert’s strategy as a distribution
over messages given his signal. Therefore, the principal can rationally update her belief about the expert’s
true signal just like in our model. Second, we can also allow the expert to directly report his type. This
is investigated in Levy (2004) who shows that the expert can never credibly transmit such information.
Therefore, our main results will not be affected if we allow for richer message spaces.
7We assume this asymmetric structure because the calculation is easier. Results do not change
qualitatively if we assume that errors in the interim news are symmetric.
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3. If the reform is started the principal receives an interim news of precision β at
T = 2 and decides whether to continue with the reform.
4. The principal finds out the true state if and only if she has persisted with the
reform after the interim news. The players receive their payoffs (see below).
We assume that the principal cares only about the return from the reform, which is
given by
W =

0 if the reform is not initiated at T = 1.
YR − k if the reform is carried out to the end.
−k if the reform is started at T = 1, but canceled at T = 2.
The expert cares only about his reputation rˆ, defined as the posterior probability
at the end of the game that the principal thinks he is of H-type. It is derived via the
Bayes’ rule from all the information the principal has at the end of the game including
the message sent by the expert, the observed output and the interim news received
(if the reform is initiated at T = 1). This is a common measure of reputation in the
career concern literature where it is assumed that the expert’s future wage is positively
correlated with rˆ. For the sake of simplicity, we follow the majority of the literature in
assuming that the expert’s payoff is linear in his reputation. The payoff is thus taken as
rˆ itself.
2.2. Equilibrium selection
We look for (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the game. It is known that
reputational cheap talk games can have a wide range of PBE. For example, there are
always babbling equilibria where both types of experts send massages at random which
are taken as meaningless by the principal. However our interest centers on the welfare
gain (or loss) of the principal due to her engagement with experts and the interim news.
So we are interested in equilibria where the expert’s recommendation is useful to her.
The equilibria we focus on satisfy the following two conditions listed in this subsection:
Condition 1. Some of the principal’s choices must depend on the message sent by the
expert.
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We will call those equilibria that satisfy condition 1 “Influential Equilibria”. This is
a natural requirement given the inquiry of the paper: if the expert’s recommendation
never influences the principal’s choice, it cannot be of any use for her and her welfare is
the same as if she acted alone.8
We impose a second requirement for the equilibria of interest. There are influential
equilibria where the principal never changes her assessment of the expert at the end of the
game. As example, consider the strategies: an L-type expert always truthfully reports
his signals; an H-type expert reports his signals truthfully with probability p. Therefore,
the message sent by the expert, whatever his type, is correct with probability p. When
p is sufficiently large, Condition 1 is met because the principal’s initial choice will follow
the expert’s recommendation. However, both type of experts are equally likely to make
a wrong recommendation in equilibrium. So the principal’s posterior assessment of the
expert’s quality is always the same as the prior regardless of whether she can observe the
true state. Therefore no expert has an incentive to deviate. We will leave out this type of
equilibria for two reasons. First, these equilibria are not robust. If experts have even an
arbitrarily small concern for the principal’s welfare, then an H-type expert would strictly
prefer to deviate and tell the truth. Second, since the principal’s ex post assessment
of the expert never changes no matter if his message is correct or not, it follows that
the interim news cannot have any effect on the expert’s reporting strategy. (See section
3.2 and the proof of Proposition 2.) Therefore this class of equilibria would distract us
from our main interest, namely, the effect of the interim news. Hence we add the second
restriction.
Condition 2. There is a positive probability that the principal’s posterior assessment of
the expert rˆ 6= r at the end of the game.
8Our notion of influential equilibrium requires a stronger condition than the commonly used infor-
mative equilibrium, which requires that the expert’s messages change the principal’s belief regarding the
state. The latter condition is necessary, but not sufficient for an influential equilibrium. For example,
when the cost c and k are very small and the interim news does not exist, there is an informative equi-
librium where the principal always carries out the reform, and the expert tells the truth (see the next
subsection). Obviously the principal’s belief on the state depends on the expert’s messages but she never
uses them for her choice.
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It is commonly assumed in communication games that players know the exact mean-
ing of the messages. Hence we will ignore mirror equilibria that just re-label the messages.
This means that in any influential equilibrium, the principal’s belief on the state is such
that α1 >
1
2 > α0. We also restrict attention to equilibria where the principal uses pure
strategies. It is possible that in some equilibria the principal may randomize over initi-
ation or cancellation, but her randomization choices must be credible given the expert’s
report and/or the interim news. This means that the intuition we gain in equilibria
where she uses pure strategies will go through and we will leave out those equilibrium
where she randomizes for the sake of brevity.
2.3. A Benchmark: If the State was Always Revealed
Before discussing the main model, it is useful to check out the outcomes if the state
always gets revealed, i.e. both when the reform and the status quo are chosen. We can
use this case to compare our later results. In this benchmark case, when assessing the
quality of the expert, the principal would ignore the interim news and simply compare
the expert’s recommendation with the true state. Both types of experts want to make the
recommendation most likely to match the true state. So given the equal prior assumption,
both types will report their signals truthfully through their messages in the influential
equilibrium, which will be unique if it exists. (See 3.3 for details of the existence issue.)
Remark 1. If the state is revealed regardless of the principal’s choice of action, both
types of experts always report their signals truthfully in the influential equilibrium.
The proof follows the intuition outlined above and hence omitted here. It is available
on request.
3. When the Status Quo Obstructs Knowledge
To keep the analysis tractable, we will assume that the sunk initiation cost k > 12
in the main body. This assumption seems natural where the reform involves significant
spending, e.g. an overhaul or a radical change of, say, the health care system or large
infrastructure projects. We will briefly investigate the case where k ≤ 12 in section 5.1.
Given the equal prior assumption and the fact that the return from a successful reform
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is YR = 1, k >
1
2 implies that in any influential equilibrium the principal will start the
reform if and only if the message is m = 1. Further, there can be only two types of
influential equilibria. In the first one, after initiating the reform, the principal continues
with it regardless of the interim news (hereafter called CE for Continuation Equilibrium).
In the other one, after initiation, the principal reverts back to the status quo if and only if
the interim news is bad (hereafter called DE for Discontinuation Equilibrium). However,
an influential equilibrium does not necessarily exist for all parameter configurations. We
will discuss the existence issue in section 3.3. Before that we will establish the experts’
strategies in both types of equilibria, conditional on their existence.
First, we will establish the following lemma that greatly simplifies the analysis of
experts’ strategies.
Lemma 1. An H-type expert truthfully reports his signals in any influential equilibrium
that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.
The intuition is quite straightforward. A correct report enhances the expert’s reputa-
tion while a wrong one lowers it as messages have their natural meanings. Now suppose
in an equilibrium an H-type expert is indifferent between sending m = 1 and 0 after get-
ting the signal s = 1. Then it must follow that an L-type expert always strictly prefers
reporting m = 0 because he is less confident of the certainty of his signals. In that case,
the principal would know for sure that the expert is of H-type whenever she gets the
message m = 1. But then the H-type expert cannot be indifferent between his messages.
3.1. Continuation Equilibrium (CE)
Suppose the precision of the interim news is sufficiently low, so that once the reform
is initiated, the principal will not revert back. (We defer the specification for the interim
news to be ‘sufficiently low’ until 3.3.) Our first observation is that an L-type expert will
not always report his signal truthfully in the CE. To appreciate the reason, suppose on
the contrary that both types of experts report their signals truthfully. Then, if m = 0,
the principal will not start the reform and so will never know the true state. Since the
expert, whatever his type, tells the truth, the principal’s posterior on expert type must be
the same as the prior following m = 0. Now, when the L-type expert truthfully reports
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his signal s = 1, the principal would carry out the reform and when the recommendation
appears wrong the expert will be exposed. Since the L-type expert knows his own type,
he would strictly prefer deviating and reporting m = 0 instead. So we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. In the continuation equilibrium, an L-type expert truthfully reports s =
0 but misreports s = 1 with positive probability. That is, tc∗L0 = 0 and t
c∗
L1 < 1.
The superscript (c∗) denotes the value of the variable in CE. We will use (d∗) for
variable values in DE below. In general the superscript (∗) will be used to denote the
equilibrium value of a variable.
3.2. Discontinuation Equilibrium (DE)
Suppose now that the interim news is sufficiently precise, so that the principal will
cancel the reform if she gets a bad news. If she reverts back to the status quo, she will
not know the true state for sure (unless β = 1). We can show that like in the case of
CE, in a discontinuation equilibrium too, an L-type expert always tells the truth when
s = 0 but misreports s = 1 with positive probability.
An interesting question is whether or not an L-type expert will recommend the reform
more often in the DE than in the CE. We can show that td∗L1 > t
c∗
L1 for all β < 1. So the
answer is yes. Note that only an L-type expert hides the signal s = 1 in equilibrium.
Therefore, with the equal prior assumption, m = 1 is more likely to be sent by an H-
type. Hence the L-type expert does have the signaling incentive to send this message
when s = 1. However, it is costly for him to do so because a wrong recommendation
would lower his reputation. In the CE, the principal would always find out if a pro-reform
recommendation was mistaken. But in the DE, when the principal cancels the reform,
she will not know with certainty whether the expert was right or wrong. Hence an L-type
expert would find it more attractive to recommend the reform in the DE. Further, when
β is smaller the principal is less sure about the true state after the cancellation, and so
the incentive for an L-type expert to send m = 1 becomes larger. On the other hand, if
β = 1, even if the principal cancels the reform, she would know for sure that the expert
had fouled up. Hence td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1 if β = 1.
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Proposition 2. In the discontinuation equilibrium, an L-type expert
1. truthfully reports s = 0 and misreports s = 1 with positive probability (td∗L1 < 1);
2. reports m = 1 more often than in the CE. That is, td∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1, with strict inequality
holding if β < 1;
3. reports m = 1 more often if the interim news is less precise. That is, dtd∗L1/dβ < 0.
3.3. Existence of Influential Equilibria
We have identified the experts’ strategies in both types of influential equilibria when
they exist. Now, the existence of a particular type of equilibrium requires that the
principal (i) starts the reform when m = 1 and (ii) reacts to the interim news in the way
that is consistent with the requirement of the equilibrium.
We first assume that the principal has indeed started the reform at T = 1 and
study her choice after the interim news. Given L-type experts’ equilibrium strategy tj∗L1,
j ∈ {c, d}, the principal’s belief that ω = 1 at the time of starting the reform is
αj∗1 =
r + (1− r)ptj∗L1
r + (1− r)tj∗L1
(1)
If now the interim news is g, the principal would know for sure that the reform will be
successful and will continue with it. On the other hand, if the interim news is b, the
principal revises her belief of ω = 1 to
αj∗1b =
αj∗1 (1− β)
1− αj∗1 β
(2)
She will therefore cancel the reform if and only if αj∗1b − (1 − αj∗1b)c < 0. Using (2), this
is equivalent to
β > 1− 1− α
j∗
1
αj∗1
c (3)
It will be useful to define a reference level of news precision
β1 = 1− 1− α
c∗
1
αc∗1
c (4)
If the L-type expert uses the CE reporting strategy, the principal will continue with the
reform in spite of bad interim news if and only if β ≤ β1. Note that for a given level
of p, β1 is a well-defined constant since an L-type expert’s strategy (and consequently,
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αc∗1 ) in the CE is independent of β. (But the value of β1 does depend on p. We suppress
this dependence in our notation for clarity of exposition.) For the welfare analysis of the
next section to be meaningful, we would like to make sure that in the CE, the L-type
expert recommends the reform with positive probability.9 The following assumption
would ensure this. (Please refer to the proof of Proposition 1.)
Assumption 1. p > r2−r
Now suppose that the L-type expert uses the DE strategy. Note that αd∗1 < αc∗1 for
all β < 1. (In the DE, αd∗1 depends on β, but we suppress this in our notation again for
the sake of exposition.) The principal is less confident that ω = 1 in the DE because
the L-type expert is now more likely to report his signal s = 1 (tc∗L1 ≤ td∗L1). It is then
clear from (4) that the constant β1 is larger than 1 − 1−α
d∗
1
αd∗1
c. Therefore, if the L-type
expert uses the DE strategy, the principal will cancel the reform after getting a bad news
for all β ≥ β1. In addition, due to continuity, she will also call off the reform following
an unfavorable news for β “not too far” below β1. This implies that there can be both
types of influential equilibria for intermediate values of β just below β1 depending on the
“coordination” of the players.10
We now turn to the principal’s initiation choice at T = 1. Suppose the expert uses
the DE strategy and (3) holds at T = 2. The principal expects to cancel the reform if
the interim news is unfavorable. Her expected payoff by initiating the reform is
WD = α
d∗
1 β − k (5)
9If tc∗L1 = 0, we have β1 = 1 so that as long as the the players ‘coordinate’ on the CE strategies (see
below for the multiple equilibria problem), the introduction of the interim news cannot have any impact
on the decision-maker’s welfare and hence our welfare question becomes moot.
10It may be asked if we can establish a unique β0 = 1− 1−α
d∗
1
αd∗1
c, so that if the L-type expert uses the
DE strategy, the principal cancels the reform if and only if β > β0. The difficulty for this is that t
d∗
L1
itself is a function of β in the DE. In particular, as β increases, td∗L1 decreases (and thus 1 − (1−α
d∗
1 )c
αd∗1
increases) as per the previous proposition. It is clear there must exist a lower bound for β below which
the DE cannot exist (it certainly does not if β → 0). However, we cannot prove analytically that such β0
is unique, although numerical simulation does suggest it is. (The result will be true if one can show that
d2td∗L1
dβ2
< 0.) We leave this question open as it does not qualitatively impact on our main investigation.
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On the other hand, if the expert uses the CE strategy and (3) does not hold at T = 2,
the principal expects to disregard bad interim news and pursue the reform to the end,
and her expected payoff from its initiation is
WC = α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k (6)
For at least one type of influential equilibrium to exist, we need
max{WD,WC} > 0 (7)
The next assumption would ensure that for all β, inequality (7) is satisfied so that at
least one type of influential equilibrium exists.
Assumption 2. r + (1− r)p > c+k1+c
Given these assumptions we can now summarize the existence results for influential
equilibria.
Proposition 3. Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold and let β1 be defined as in (4).
1. A CE exists if and only if β ≤ β1.
2. There exists some βL < β1 such that for all β > βL, a DE exists.
Figure 1 below gives an example that illustrates the dependence of an L-type expert’s
recommendation strategy on β as well as the existence of influential equilibria.
4. Welfare and Delegation
4.1. When Second Opinions Hurt
We will now address the central concerns of this paper: what are the effects of the
interim news on the principal’s welfare? The first question is whether the principal at
all benefits from having access to an interim news of some given precision β. In this case
we may imagine as if there was an extra ‘Stage 0’ before the game started. In this stage
the principal can make an irreversible decision on whether to use the interim news or
ignore it altogether. For example, a government may choose (not choose) to set up a
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Figure 1: Here p = 0.6, r = 0.5, c = 1.4 and k = 0.5. In the CE, which exists for β < β1, t
c∗
L1 is a
constant. The DE exists for β > βL. Note that t
d∗
L1 ≥ tc∗L1 and dtd∗L1/dβ < 0.
monitoring body that provides interim feedback on the progress of the reform. It turns
out that the exogenously given quality of the news β would be crucial in this decision.
Clearly, if the quality of the interim news is very poor (p small) so that players remain
in the CE after its introduction, the principal’s welfare is unaffected. However, if the
introduction of the interim news results in a switch from the CE to the DE, the L-type
expert will now recommend the reform more often. Recall that the principal starts the
reform at T = 1 only if the expert’s message is 1. If this recommendation actually comes
from an L-type expert, the principal will obtain the positive payoff 1 only when both the
expert advice and the interim news are correct. The probability of such an event is pβ.
Since the reform incurs a non-refundable sunk cost k, the principal will benefit from an
L-type expert’s more frequent pro-reform recommendation if and only if pβ > k.
To get a more concrete idea we will first focus on the reference value of β = β1. This
value is important for two reasons. First, the introduction of an interim news would al-
ways result in the DE if β > β1; so there is no ambiguity about the principal’s welfare from
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possible multiplicity of equilibria. Second, if experts follow the CE reporting-strategy,
at β1 the principal is just indifferent between canceling and continuing the reform when
n = b. Therefore, at β = β1 any change in the principal’s welfare comes entirely from
the increase in the frequency of the L-type expert’s reform message. As discussed above,
the principal would benefit from it if and only if pβ1 > k. To get the definitive results
presented in the next proposition, we will impose a regularity assumption which ensures
that ∂β1∂p > 0. Effectively it assumes that the proportion of H-type experts, r, is not too
large. We denote this value of r by r∗. Numerically, r∗ is just above 0.47.11
Assumption 3. Let r < r∗.
We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let assumptions (1)- (3) hold.12 There exists a unique pˆ ∈ (k, c+k1+c )
such that
1. For all p < pˆ, there is some βM (p) > β1 such that, the principal’s welfare is strictly
less when she has access to the interim news if and only if β ∈ (β1, βM (p)).
2. When p ≥ pˆ, having access to the interim news will strictly improve the principal’s
welfare for all β > β1.
When the state is not observable in the status quo, the principal will surely be worse
off if the L-type expert’s quality is poor and the precision of the interim news too is
not far above β1. On the other hand, if the expert’s quality is sufficiently good, having
11In general, β1 is not always monotonically increasing in the entire range of p ∈ (0.5, 1). This is
because an increase in p has two effects: it makes the L-type expert’s signal more precise, but it also
encourages him to report his s = 1 signal more often. So the overall effect on the DM’s belief αc∗1 can be
ambiguous. It turns out that a sufficient condition for ∂β1
∂p
> 0 is
r <
2p
(1− p)2 [
√
1 + (1− p)2 − 1]
r∗ is defined as the minimum of the RHS. The RHS is increasing in p for all p ∈ (0.5, 1) and its minimum
when p = 0.5 is just over 0.47.
12A qualitatively similar result holds if we dispense with assumption 3. The first part of proposition 4
holds for p < k and the second part holds for p > c+k
1+c
. But for p ∈ (k, c+k
1+c
) we cannot establish a unique
cutoff pˆ as in the proposition. Please refer to the proof for more details.
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access to any interim news above β1 will benefit the principal.Figure 2 illustrates the
proposition with an example.
Figure 2: Here, we take k = 0.5, c = 0.5 and r = 0.4. The principal’s welfare is higher in the DE than
in the CE if and only if β lies above the βM (p) curve. When p < pˆ, the curve βM (p) is above β1, so that
the principal will be worse off with an interim news if β1 < β < βM (p). On the other hand, for all p > pˆ,
she is always better off when β > β1. (We did not plot those p larger than 0.75 so that the position of
the curves can be seen more clearly.)
The above proposition characterizes the welfare effects of interim news with precision
exceeding β1. Some observations for the range β ≤ β1 can be deduced as corollary.
Clearly, if CE is the only equilibrium for a value of β ≤ β1, having access to the interim
news or not is immaterial for the principal’s welfare. Hence, we will restrict attention
to β ∈ (βL, β1] where multiple influential equilibria exist according to Proposition 3.
Assume that if the principal decides to use the interim news at stage 0, the players
‘coordinate’ on the DE. In this case, if p < pˆ, the principal would be harmed by the
interim news even more because an L-type expert would be encouraged to recommend
the reform even more often. On the other hand when p > pˆ, it follows by continuity
(from the second part of the last proposition) that the principal is better off when β is
not too far below β1.
Corollary 1. Let β ∈ (βL, β1] and assumptions (1)-(3) hold. Assume that when the
18
principal avails the interim news, players coordinate on the DE.
1. If p < pˆ, the principal is strictly worse off by gaining access to the interim news.
2. If p > pˆ, there exists some βm(p) ∈ [βL, β1) such that for all β ∈ (βm(p), β1], the
principal is strictly better off by gaining access to the interim news.
It is worthwhile to note that the (in)ability of the principal to commit to a particular
action after getting the interim news is crucial to her welfare. When p < pˆ and β ∈
(βL, βM (p)), her welfare is reduced as she is unable to continue with the reform in the
face of an unfavorable news. The reason, as we have seen, is that it induces an L-type
expert to recommend the reform more aggressively. On the other hand, when p > pˆ and
β ∈ (βm(p), β1], if the principal can commit to canceling the reform after a bad news,
she can exploit the advantage of the interim news by coordinating with the expert on
the DE and encourage him to make pro-reform recommendation.
4.2. Optimal Interim News
The above analysis shows that when the expert’s information is of very poor quality,
the principal can be harmed by availing an interim news. That would happen if the
quality of the interim news is in a certain intermediate range. This observation arose
when analyzing a binary issue: whether to use an interim news of a given quality or not.
However there are scenarios where the principal can actively influence the quality of the
interim news. For example, the news may be researched and processed by government
departments or private consulting firms, and the government might be able to improve
its quality by hiring more qualified staff, choosing among consulting firms or making
other forms of investment. In this scenario it is useful to ask: even when an interim news
produces benefit, would the principal be better off as the interim news becomes more
and more precise? Is β = 1 the optimal quality of interim news? In order to focus on
the effect of β alone, we will assume that it is costless to increase its value.
A marginal increase of β has no effect on the principal’s welfare in the CE. Therefore
we will focus on the principal’s payoff in the DE, which we denote by V ∗D. (See the proof
of proposition 4 for a discussion of V ∗D.). The marginal effect of β on V
∗
D is:
dV ∗D
dβ
=
1
2
[r + (1− r)ptd∗L1] +
1
2
(1− r)(pβ − k)dt
d∗
L1
dβ
(8)
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The equation shows that any increase in β produces two effects. First, given the expert’s
recommendation strategy, an increase in β means that a correct reform decision is less
likely to be reversed by a misleading interim news. Second, there is a strategic effect: as
β increases, L-type experts are less likely to make pro-reform recommendation. Recall
that the principal prefers L-type experts to truthfully report the signal s = 1 if and only
if pβ > k. When p < k, the principal does not want an L-type expert to recommend the
reform at all and the strategic effect is positive for her welfare as
dtd∗L1
dβ < 0. In this case,
a higher β is always beneficial to the principal. However, when p is sufficiently large so
that pβ > k, the overall effect becomes ambiguous. The principal may not benefit from
increase of β all the way to 1. Large β may excessively discourage an L-type expert
from recommending the reform. We cannot produce an analytical condition as necessary
and sufficient for welfare to be decreasing in β because of irregular properties of the
underlying functions. However, we have worked through numerical simulations showing
welfare peaking at values of β < 1. As an illustration we produce a plot of the principal’s
payoff against β where k = 0.55, p = 0.7 and r = 0.8.
Figure 3: The marginal effect of β on VD
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. 1. When p ≤ k, the optimal level of β for the principal is 1.
2. When p > k, it is possible that the optimal β is less than 1.
The Proof of the first part follows from the above discussion. That of the second part
comes from simulations as illustrated by the numerical example.
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We will like to contrast these welfare results against the benchmark case where the
state always gets revealed. There both types of experts always report truthfully no
matter how the principal is expected to react to the interim news. Denote by αB∗1 the
principal’s belief that ω = 1 after getting a pro-reform recommendation in the benchmark
case. From (1), αB∗1 = r + (1 − r)p and the principal will cancel the reform following a
bad interim news if and only if
β > 1− (1− α
B∗
1 )c
αB∗1
(9)
Since experts’ strategies will remain the same for all values of β, it is clear that the
principal cannot be worse off with the interim news. Further, if she acts according to
the interim news, her payoff must be strictly increasing in β.
Remark 2. If the state is always revealed,
1. Having access to the interim news never hurts the principal and strictly increases
her welfare if (9) holds.
2. In the DE, a marginal increase in β strictly increases the principal’s welfare and
the optimal level of β is 1.
The proof directly follows from the above discussion and is omitted.
4.3. Delegation
As we have seen, the principal’s reaction to the interim news is crucial in determin-
ing the expert’s recommendation, which in turn affects the principal’s payoff. The above
analysis suggests that the principal can improve her payoff by pre-committing to par-
ticular actions, thereby inducing the expert to report in a way that is better for her.
One way of doing this is to delegate the decision right to another decision-maker who
is known to have a different preference about the reform/action.13 For concreteness, we
can think of the principal as a government whose costs and benefits are the same as that
13We may ask what happens if the principal delegates the decision rights to the expert. In our
model, the expert cares only about his reputation. Therefore, there cannot be an informative/influential
equilibrium where in the second period the L type expert himself cancels the reform after a bad news for
any β < 1. Doing so would expose his ignorance. This shows the importance of separating the expert
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of the population. To counter the effects of experts’ strategic behavior, the government
can appoint a ‘well-known’ official to take charge of the decisions regarding a particular
reform. The official is known to favour the reform in question or is much against it as the
case may be, and so would bear a significantly different personal cost compared with the
public if the reform fails.14 Delegation of this kind as a mechanism for pre-commitment
in reputational cheap talk games has been discussed in a previous work by Sanyal and
Sengupta (2008). The model of that paper however does not study the effect of interim
news or second opinion.
To develop the argument we imagine that there is a continuous pool of potential
decision-makers who share the same benefit and initiation cost as the principal, but
differ in terms of their respective failure cost cj , which is distributed over [0,+∞). We
have seen that for p < pˆ and β ∈ (βL, βM (p)), the principal would benefit by committing
to ignore the interim news. Therefore, if institutional arrangements permit, she would
be better off by delegating the decision rights to a person with cj < c. Conversely, let
p > pˆ and β ∈ (βm(p), β1] as defined in Corollary 1. Suppose for concreteness, that the
players are stuck in the CE. The principal would then be better off by delegating the
decision rights to someone with cj > c thus committing to cancel the reform if there is
a bad news.
Proposition 6. Let assumptions (1)-(3) hold.
1. If p < pˆ, whenever the interim news makes the principal worse off, she will be better
off delegating the decision to a decision-maker with cj < c.
2. If p > pˆ, and β ∈ (βm(p), β1], if originally the players are in the CE, the principal
will be better off delegating the decision to a decision-maker with sufficiently large
cj > c.
and the decision-maker for our paper. In addition, the initiation strategy of the expert in the first period
would be the same as that in the CE identified in our model. A model where the expert himself makes
all the decision in a multi-stage setting has been studied by Majumdar and Mukand (2004).
14Governments are seen to appoint politicians or public officials for specific actions, who are known
as hawkish or dovish in relation to the action. Quite clearly they do not represent the median voter’s
opinion on the action.
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5. Discussion
This section discusses the structural features of our model and major assumptions.
The purpose is to clarify their analytical role as also to discuss the robustness of the
results of the paper in relation to these assumptions and features.
5.1. When k ≤ 12
Return from the successful action/reform has been normalized as 1 in our model. This
provides a scale for fixing the value of k, the irrecoverable expenditure of the action. If
k ≤ 12 there is an extra type of influential equilibrium, which we may give the name of
‘initiation equilibrium’ (IE). In this equilibrium the principal would initiate the reform
regardless of the message. She would then revert back to the status quo if and only if
the interim news n = b and the message sent by the expert was m = 0 at T = 1. To
save space, we will briefly explore the intuition behind the equilibrium strategy of the
L-type expert, denoted by tI∗Ls and the welfare implication of the interim news. (H- type
expert still tells the truth. The proof for this is similar to that for Lemma 1.) A detailed
mathematical analysis can be available upon request.
First, the IE arises only if the interim news is available. Otherwise, the only influential
equilibrium clearly is still the CE as before. Now suppose the interim news is available.
If k is sufficiently small, even when the expert advises against the reform, the principal is
willing to initiate it and cancel it only after a subsequent bad news. Indeed, when k = 0,
it becomes weakly dominant for her to do so. Since there is a positive probability that
the principal will find out the true state in the IE even if the expert recommends m = 0,
it becomes less attractive for the L-type expert to lie when his signal is s = 1. Therefore,
compared to the CE, he now advises the reform more often, i.e., tI∗L1 ≥ tc∗L1. (But he
would still truthfully report s = 0.) Further, as β increases, the principal is more likely
to learn the true state, which further decreases the expert’s lying incentive so that we
have
dtI∗L1
dβ > 0. We should note that an L-type expert recommends the reform more often
in the IE for a reason that is exactly opposite of that in the DE. In the DE, the fact that
the principal cancels the reform after a bad interim news prevents her from learning the
true state. This emboldens an L-type expert to send more pro-reform recommendations,
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which is a signal of being smart. Further we had
dtd∗L1
dβ < 0 in the DE, as the principal
has a better idea about the true state as β increases.
The welfare effect of the interim news follows similar lines as in our original analysis.
In the IE, the failure cost c cannot be avoided if the message is m = 1 as the principal will
continue the reform whatever interim news follows it. So the principal can benefit from
more frequent pro-reform recommendations from an L-type expert only if p is sufficiently
large relative to c and k. In fact, even when k = 0, it is possible that the principal is worse
off by having access to the interim news, as demonstrated by the following example.
Let p = 0.51, r = 0.65, c = 5 and k = 0. First let β = 0. The only possible influential
equilibrium is the CE, in which tc∗L1 = 0.108 and the expected welfare of the principal is
V ∗C = 0.289. Now let β = 0.45. The CE is impossible because k = 0 and β > 0. In the
IE, one can check that tI∗L1 = 0.390. It can be calculated that the expected payoff of the
principal is V ∗I = 0.256 < V
∗
C .
5.2. Simultaneous Reporting
Our model has a time line punctuated by the sequential arrival of two messages. The
expert’s message arrives at T = 1, while the interim news becomes available at T = 2. We
should check what role this time line plays. Consider an alternative environment where
the expert and the source of the interim news simultaneously announce their messages.
In this setup the initiation cost k and the failure cost c of our model can be combined
into a single cost item after proper re-scaling of the payoff.
One crucial difference is that in the alternative simultaneous reporting setting, the
principal can always obtain both messages. In our two-stage model, by reporting m = 0,
the expert can prevent the principal from starting the reform and consequently, getting
the interim news. We believe this setup is suitable for capturing many real life situations
where the appropriateness of an action can not be judged without proceeding some way
along it. Second, the two-stage setup and the sunk cost are crucial to the central welfare
results of Propositions 4 and 5. To see this, suppose in the simultaneous reporting model
the expert originally uses the CE reporting strategy. Now if we increase β beyond β1
as defined in (4) (accounting for the fact that the failure cost c has been rescaled), the
principal will never initiate the reform if n = b no matter what the expert recommends.
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This implies that the interim news is so precise that the expert’s recommendation is not
of any relevance. (The principal will always start the reform after n = g.) Hence the
fact that the L-type expert might change her reporting strategy has no impact on the
principal’s welfare for all β > β1.
15 Also, unlike our observation in Proposition 5, the
optimal level of β is always 1 even when the state is not observed, because no matter
what the expert reports, he cannot prevent the principal from accessing the additional
information.
5.3. Unequal Priors and Symmetric Information
Our assumption that a priori the states are equally likely means that an H-type
expert is equally likely to get both signals. Therefore getting a particular signal is not
an indication of smartness. Hence, an L-type expert has an incentive to recommend the
status quo only because he is less likely to be exposed if it is chosen. With unequal
prior, an H-type expert is more likely to see one signal than the other; hence the L-type
expert’s signalling incentive gets more complicated. However, he will still recommend
the status quo more often than he actually observes s = 0, as long as the prior is not too
heavily biased towards ω = 1.
Let pi ∈ (0, 1) be the prior that ω = 1. If pi < 12 , an H-type expert is more likely
to receive s = 0. Therefore, reporting m = 0 is a signal of being an H-type and this
increases the incentive for an L-type expert to recommend the status quo even further.
The opposite argument would indicate that if pi > 12 , it will be less attractive for the
L-type expert to misreport his s = 1 signal. But by continuity, if pi is not too far above
1
2 , the incentive of hiding his ignorance is still dominant.
On the other hand, the assumption of asymmetric information is quite important for
the results of this paper. This is because experts’ signalling incentives in our model arise
from the fact that they know their types. A number of contributions in the literature show
that the outcome of reputational cheap talk games depend on whether the information
15In this set up, the result that the principal can be worse off when the introduction of the interim
news changes the expert’s behavior has to rely on the existence of multiple equilibira for intermediate
β < β1. In the two-stage model, as Proposition 4 shows, the result does not depend on such multiplicity
at all when β > β1.
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about experts’ type is symmetric. (See Li (2007) and Levy (2004) for example.) Results
of our paper will change quite drastically if the expert does not know his own type, and
if we further dispense with the equal prior assumption. In particular, for k > 12 , we can
show that a slight bias in the prior belief towards the status quo will lead to complete
disappearance of any influential equilibrium. See Brandenburger and Polak (1996) and
Liu (2011) for more detailed investigation of this phenomenon.
5.4. If the Expert Has Some Concern for the Reform’s Outcome
If experts also care about the principal’s welfare, i.e., the reform’s outcome, the
misreporting incentive of L-type experts will fall. An L-type expert’s reporting strategy
t∗L1 in influential equilibria will move closer to what is better for the principal. For
example, in the DE, the principal would like the L-type expert to always report truthfully
if pβ > k. Otherwise, she would prefer that he never recommends the reform. The
incentive from the expert’s concerns about the reform outcome or principal’s welfare
also works in the same direction. Therefore, compared to the situation where the expert
cares only about his reputation, now in the DE, td∗L1 is larger (resp. smaller) if pβ is
greater (resp. smaller) than k. This would make the principal better off. However,
results of the paper will not change qualitatively if the expert does not put too much
weight on the outcome of the reform.
6. Summing Up
We have presented a reputational cheap talk model where, after initiating a reform
recommended by the expert, the principal receives an independent second opinion/news
and has the option of returning to the status quo. The status quo however does not pro-
duce any information about what the true state is. The two-stage set-up, the separation
of the expert with career concerns from the decision-maker, and the uninformativeness
of the status quo are crucial features that we wanted to incorporate in the analysis, as
we think they characterize many important decision-making situations. They are also
crucial to the results obtained in the paper.
The principal’s decision about continuing or discontinuing the reform after the interim
news has pronounced effects on the expert’s recommendation. If the principal retracts
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the reform, the expert who recommended it would escape being fully marked down when
the advice is inappropriate. This encourages those experts who are not too sure of what
they recommend, to advise the reform more often than otherwise. This act of posturing
by less informed experts is the focus of this paper. We have shown that the availability
of an interim news/second opinion is not unambiguously better for the principal. And,
when it is better, it is not necessarily the case that an improvement of its precision would
increase the principal’s payoff further.
The model highlights the importance of the principal’s commitment to specific actions
for influencing experts’ strategy. It also identifies the delegation of decision-making as
a pre-commitment mechanism by the principal when the existence and quality of the
interim news is outside her control. By delegating to actors with well-known preferences,
the principal/government is sometimes able to signal pre-commitment to a particular line
of action regarding the interim news. This provides a plausible line of thinking about
appointments done by governments regarding specific reforms and cases of apparently
unreasonable persistence or about-turn with policies and reforms.
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A. Proofs
We will denote the information available to the principal at the end of the game by
I = {m, ωˆ, nˆ}. The principal always gets a report m from the expert. Her information
about the true state of the world is denoted by ωˆ ∈ {1, 0,ω}. If she initiates the reform
and sticks to it until the end, she will know the true state by observing the return. (ω̂ = 1
if and only if Y = 1.) If the reform is not initiated or canceled after the interim news,
the principal will not know the true state (hence ωˆ = ω). The possible interim news
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the principal might receive is denoted by nˆ ∈ {g, b,n}. If the principal has chosen the
status quo at the beginning, she would not receive any news so nˆ = n.
We use Uis(m) to denote the i-type agent’s expected payoff from reporting m when
he gets the signal s.
A.1. Lemma 1
A general proof over all parameter ranges is cumbersome due to the fact that the
expression for the expert’s reputational payoff depends on the principal’s choices. Here
we will provide the proof for k > 12 , which is the case studied in detail in the text. We
also concentrate on the Discontinuation Equilibrium and the case where the state is not
revealed after choosing status quo. The case for the Continuation Equilibrium is proved
in a similar way.
Proof. First note that since k > 12 , the principal will never initiate the reform if m = 0.
On the other hand, the definition of influential equilibrium requires that she always starts
the reform when m = 1. The expected payoff of the experts are
UHs(0) = ULs(0) = rˆ(0,ω,n) for s = 0, 1
UH1(1) = βrˆ(1, 1, g) + (1− β)rˆ(1,ω, b)
UL1(1) = pβrˆ(1, 1, g) + [p(1− β) + (1− p)]rˆ(1,ω, b)
UL0(1) = (1− p)βrˆ(1, 1, g) + [(1− p)(1− β) + p]rˆ(1,ω, b)
It can be shown that rˆ(1, 1, g) > rˆ(1,ω, b) if and only if rˆ(1, 1, g) > rˆ(1, 0, b).16 We first
claim that an H-type expert does not randomize when his signal is s = 1. Suppose to the
contrary he does so. This would imply that UH1(0) = UH1(1). If rˆ(1, 1, g) > rˆ(1,ω, b),
16To see this, we may explicitly write out the relevant expressions.
rˆ(1, 1, g) =
rtH1
rtH1 + (1− r)[pLtL1 + (1− pL)tL0]
rˆ(1, 0, b) =
rtH0
rtH0 + (1− r)[(1− pL)tL1 + pLtL0]
rˆ(1,ω, b) = rtH0 + (1− β)rtH1
rtH0 + (1− r)[(1− pL)tL1 + pLtL0] + (1− β)[rtH1 + (1− r)[pLtL1 + (1− pL)tL0]]
Some simple algebraic manipulation shows the claim is true.
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we must have
UL0(1) < UL1(1) < UH1(1) = UH1(0) = UL1(0) = UL0(0)
in which case, an L-type expert will never report m = 1. But then UH1(1) = 1 > UH1(0).
A similar argument shows that it is impossible to have rˆ(1, 1, g) < rˆ(1,ω, b) as the L-
type expert will never report m = 0. Finally consider rˆ(1, 1, g) = rˆ(1,ω, b). This would
imply that
rˆ(1, 1, g) = rˆ(1,ω, b) = rˆ(1, 0, b) = rˆ(0,ω,n)
Note the last equality follows because UH1(0) = UH1(1), as we assumed the H-type
randomizes at s = 1. But this means that the principal’s posterior belief of the expert’s
type never changes and violates condition 2 of the influential equilibrium. Hence we
have proved that an H-type expert does not randomize if s = 1. A similar argument will
establish that he cannot randomize when s = 0, either. The lemma then follows because
we ignore ‘mirror equilibria’ by assumption.
A.2. Proposition 1
Proof. First note that the principal’s posterior assessments of the expert given the
latter’s strategies, are
rˆ(1, 0, b) = 0 17 (10)
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)(ptcL1 + (1− p)tcL0)
(11)
rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(2− tcL1 − tcL0)
18 (12)
We first establish that tc∗L0 = 0. Suppose on the contrary t
c∗
L0 > 0. This means, for an
L-type expert,
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) > (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) = UL0(1) ≥ rˆ(0,ω,n) = UL0(0)
17Strictly speaking, since we assume that an H type expert gets perfect signals, we need to consider
the off-equilibrium event: tc∗L1 = 0, the principal receives m = 1 but the output is Y = −c. We assume
that in this case, the principal believes that the message comes from the L-type expert.
18To understand the denominator, note that if the expert is L-type, in state 1, he sends m = 0 with
probability p(1− tcL1) + (1− p)(1− tcL0). In state 0, he sends m = 0 with probability p(1− tcL0) + (1−
p)(1− tcL1). The expression then follows from our assumption that each state is equally likely.
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So tc∗L1 = 1. But then one can check that, for all t
c∗
L1 > 0,
prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
pr
r + (1− r)(p+ (1− p)tc∗L0)
< rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(1− tc∗L0)
and we have a contradiction. Hence tc∗L0 = 0.
Now suppose the L-type expert gets s = 1. Given tc∗L0 = 0, his expected payoffs from
reporting m = 1 and m = 0 are, respectively,
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− p)rˆ(1, 0, b) = pr
r + (1− r)ptcL1
UL1(0) = rˆ(0,ω,n) = r
r + (1− r)(2− tcL1)
When tcL1 = 1, UL1(1) < UL1(0) since p < 1. Hence in the CE t
c∗
L1 < 1. In equilibrium
the L-type expert randomizes at s = 1 if and only if there exists a tc∗L1 ∈ (0, 1), such that
pr
r + (1− r)ptc∗L1
=
r
r + (1− r)(2− tc∗L1)
(13)
It is easy to verify that if p > r2−r , there exists a unique t
c∗
L1 = 1− r(1−p)2p(1−r) such that the
above holds as equality. If p ≤ r2−r , the above can never hold for any tc∗L1 > 0.19
A.3. Proposition 2
Proof. First note that if the principal cancels the reform after a bad news, her belief
about the expert’s type is
rˆ(1,ω, b) = r(1− β)
r(1− β) + (1− r)[(ptdL1 + (1− p)tdL0)(1− β) + ((1− p)tdL1 + ptdL0)]
(14)
We will omit the proofs for td∗L0 = 0 and t
d∗
L1 < 1 as they are very similar to that in
Proposition 1. As in proposition 1, the value of td∗L1 is determined by equating the expert’s
expected payoff of reporting m = 1 and m = 0, when s = 1. They are respectively,
UL1(1) = pβrˆ(1, 1, nˆ) + (1− pβ)rˆ(1,ω, b)
=
pβr
r + (1− r)ptd∗L1
+
(1− pβ)r
r + (1− r)[p+ 1−p1−β ]td∗L1
19The result that tc∗L1 = 0 for all p ≤ r2−r is due to our assumption that the H type expert gets a
perfect signal and the belief off the equilibrium discussed in footnote 16. If we assume instead the H
type expert also has noisy information, with pL < pH < 1, in equilibrium we have 0 < t
c∗
L1 < 1, t
c∗
L0 = 0
and the H type always reports truthfully. The idea of the proof is identical to Lemma 1 and the current
proposition.
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and UL1(0) =
r
r + (1− r)(2− td∗L1)
It is easy to see that ∂UL1(1)
∂td∗L1
< 0 and one can verify, after some algebra, that ∂UL1(1)∂β < 0.
Thus
dtd∗L1
dβ < 0.
Finally, note that when β = 1, rˆ(1,ω, b) = rˆ(1, 0, b), so that UL1(1) is the same as
that in the CE and we have td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1. It then follows that for all β < 1, t
d∗
L1 > t
c∗
L1.
A.4. Proposition 3
Proof. First consider the CE. We have αc∗1 > r + (1− r)p > c+k1+c . So the principal will
indeed initiate the reform after m = 1. By construction, she will persist with it to the
end after n = b if and only if β ≤ β1. (Note that tc∗L1 is independent of β.)
Now consider the DE. For all β > β1, we have
β > 1− (1− α
c∗
1 )c
αc∗1
> 1− (1− α
d∗
1 (.))c
αd∗1 (.)
(15)
[Recall that αd∗1 depends on β but we denote it by (.) to avoid cluttering of notations.]
The last inequality holds because αd∗1 (.) < αc∗1 for all β < 1. Therefore (3) holds and the
principal cancels the reform after n = b. Since the failure cost is always avoided in the
DE, the principal starts the reform at m = 1 if and only if,
αd∗1 (.)β > k (16)
This is always true because by (15),
αd∗1 (.)β > α
d∗
1 (.)(1−
(1− αd∗1 (.))c
αd∗1 (.)
)
= αd∗1 (.)(1 + c)− c >
c+ k
1 + c
(1 + c)− c = k (17)
the last inequality follows because αd∗1 (.) > r+(1−r)p > c+k1+c . Thus the DE always exists
for all β > β1. Second, it follows by continuity that there exists some δ > 0 sufficiently
small such that both (16) and (3) hold for all β ∈ (βL, β1), where βL = β1 − δ.
A.5. Proposition 4
Proof. Let q(.) denote the probability that the principal receives m = 1 in equilibrium.
Note that q(.) depends only on the L-type expert’s strategy when his signal is s = 1.
This is so because an H-type always reports his signals truthfully and so does an L-type
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when he gets s = 0. So let q(tj∗L1) be the probability that the principal receives m = 1 in
equilibrium of type j. We then have
q(tj∗L1) =
1
2
[r + (1− r)tj∗L1] (18)
Expected payoffs of the principal in the CE and DE are, respectively,
V ∗C = q(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k] (19)
V ∗D(β) = q(t
d∗
L1(β))[α
d∗
1 (t
d∗
L1(β))β − k] (20)
As before, we will suppress the argument in td∗L1(.) and α
d∗
1 (.) while remembering that
they are functions of β. Substituting the relevant terms, we can verify that
∂V ∗D
∂td∗L1
≥ 0 iff pβ ≥ k
By construction, we have at β1
V ∗C = q(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k] = q(tc∗L1)[αc∗1 β1 − k] (21)
Define pˆ such that pˆβ1 = k. Assumption 3 guarantees that such pˆ must be unique
and pβ1 < k if and only if p < pˆ. It can also be readily checked that k < pˆ <
c+k
1+c .
20 Now
suppose p < pˆ. Then at β1,
V ∗D|β=β1 = q(td∗L1)[αd∗1 (td∗L1)β1 − k]
< q(tc∗L1)[α
c∗
1 (t
c∗
L1)β1 − k] = V ∗C
The inequality follows from the fact that
∂V ∗D
∂t∗L1
< 0 when pβ1 < k and t
c∗
L1 < t
d∗
L1. The last
equality comes from (21). When β = 1,
V ∗D|β=1 = q(td∗L1)[αd∗1 (td∗L1)− k]
= q(tc∗L1)[α
c∗
1 − k] > q(tc∗L1)[αc∗1 − (1− αc∗1 )c− k] = V ∗C
The second equality follows because at β = 1, td∗L1 = t
c∗
L1. To prove part (1) of the
proposition, we only need to show that there exists a unique βM (p) such that V
∗
D|βM (p) =
V ∗C . Differentiate V
∗
D with respect to β, we have
dV ∗D
dβ
=
1
2
[r + (1− r)ptd∗L1] +
1
2
(1− r)(pβ − k)dt
d∗
L1
dβ
(22)
20When p > c+k
1+c
, we have αc∗1 >
c+k
1+c
, which implies that β1 >
k(1+c)
k+c
and pβ1 > k.
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Since
dtd∗L1
dβ < 0,
dWd
dβ > 0 as long as pβ ≤ k. If p ≤ k, this obviously is true for all β ≤ 1
and the proof is done. Consider some p ∈ (k, pˆ). Let β′ be such that pβ′ = k. For all
β > β′, we have
V ∗D|β>β′ = q(td∗L1)[αd∗1 (td∗L1)β − k]
> q(tc∗L1)[α
c∗
1 (t
c∗
L1)β − k]
> q(tc∗L1)[α
c∗
1 (t
c∗
L1)β1 − k] = V ∗C (23)
The first inequality follows because pβ > k by construction. The second inequality is
true because β > β′ > β1. Now since V ∗D is increasing in β for all β ≤ β′, it must follow
that the βM (p) < β
′ and hence must be unique.
To prove part(2), consider some p > pˆ. So we have pβ1 > k by construction. For all
β > β1, the result now follows by an identical argument as in (23).
A.6. Corollary 1
Proof. Part (1). Let p < pˆ. When β < β1, following the same arguments as in the last
proposition,
V ∗D|β<β1 = q1(td∗L1)[αd∗1 β − k]
< q1(t
c∗
L1)[α
c∗
1 β − k] < q1(tc∗L1)[αc∗1 β1 − k] = V ∗C
Part (2) Let βm(p) = β1 − η, where η > 0. By making η sufficiently small so that
βm(p) ∈ (βL, β1), the existence of the DE is guaranteed. Since V ∗D|β1 > V ∗C when p > pˆ,
again, by taking η → 0, the result follows by continuity of V ∗D in β.
A.7. Proposition 6
Proof. Part (1). This follows directly from proposition 4. Suppose the principal is
strictly worse off when an interim news is available. If she delegates the decision rights
to another person with cj → 0, this person will surely ignore any interim news. The CE
is then restored.
Part (2). For all β ∈ (βm(p), β1), by choosing some cj sufficiently large, we have
β ≥ 1− (1− α
c∗
1 )cj
αc∗1
> 1− (1− α
d∗
1 )cj
αd∗1
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This implies that (i) the CE is no longer viable; and (ii) by construction, αd∗1 β > k for
all β > βL and hence the new decision maker will start the reform and the DE exists.
B. Additional Material, Not for Publication
These materials contain mathematical derivation omitted in the main text. They are
not intended for publication, but can be made available to readers upon request.
B.1. The Proof for Remark 1
Proof. We first explicitly write the principal’s posterior assessment of the expert. (The
proof that an H-type expert always tells the truth follows a similar line to Lemma 1 and
is hence omitted.)
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)[ptL1 + (1− p)tL0] ≥ r (24)
rˆ(0, 0,n) = r
r + (1− r)[p(1− tL0) + (1− p)(1− tL1)] ≥ r (25)
rˆ(1, 0, nˆ) = rˆ(0, 1, nˆ) = 0
When s = 1
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL1(0) = (1− p)rˆ(0, 0,n)
If s = 0,
UL0(1) = (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) and UL0(0) = prˆ(0, 0,n)
To prove that an L-type expert strictly prefers to tell the truth, it suffices to show that
UL1(1) > UL1(0) and UL0(0) > UL0(1). Suppose not and, for example, let UL1(1) ≤
UL1(0). Since p >
1
2 , we must then have rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) < rˆ(0, 0,n). But then it must follow
that UL0(0) > UL0(1) and the L-type expert will strictly prefer reporting m = 0 when
s = 0, i.e., tL0 = 0. Substituting into (24) and (25), we have
rˆ(1, 1, nˆ) =
r
r + (1− r)ptL1 ≥ rˆ(0, 0,n) =
r
r + (1− r)[p+ (1− p)(1− tL1)]
for all tL1 ∈ [0, 1], which is a contradiction. A similar argument rules out the possibility
that UL0(0) ≤ UL0(1).
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B.2. The Case of k < 12
Here we investigate the L-type expert’s strategy in the Initiation Equilibrium. When
the L-type expert gets s = 1, his expected payoffs from reporting m = 1 and m = 0 are,
respectively
UL1(1) = prˆ(1, 1, g) and UL1(0) = (1− pβ)rˆ(0,ω, b)
When s = 0, the payoffs are
UL0(1) = (1− p)rˆ(1, 1, g) and UL0(0) = (1− (1− p)β)rˆ(0,ω, b)
Standard reasoning shows that tI∗L0 = 0 so that he always truthfully reports s = 0 signal.
This implies that the principal’s posterior belief on the expert is
rˆ(1, 1, g) =
r
r + (1− r)ptI∗L1
and
rˆ(0,ω, b) = r
r + (1− r)[(p(1− tI∗L1) + (1− p))(1− β) + ((1− p)(1− tI∗L1) + p)]
The L-type expert uses a strategy tI∗L1 ∈ (0, 1) in the IE if and only if the following holds.
prˆ(1, 1, g) = (1− pβ)rˆ(0,ω, b) (26)
The LHS, i.e., the expression for UL1(1) from the above is exactly the same as that in
the CE. We can verify that (1) the RHS, i.e., the expression for UL1(0) is strictly smaller
than that in the CE, and (2) ∂RHS∂β < 0. Therefore we conclude that (1) t
I∗
L1 ≥ tc∗L1 and
(2)
dtI∗L1
dβ > 0. In fact, we can check that (26) holds for t
I∗
L1 < 1 if and only if
(1− r)p(2p− 1)β ≤ r(1− p− pβ)
Otherwise, we have tI∗L1 = 1 in the IE.
B.3. Unequal Prior
We will illustrate the idea with the CE here. To see the reasoning of the text formally,
note that in a candidate truth-telling equilibrium, the posterior reputation for making
the correct m = 1 recommendation and recommending m = 0 are, respectively,
r
r + (1− r)p and
r
r + (1− r)[ pi1−pi (1− p) + p]
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while an incorrect m = 1 recommendation results in rˆ = 0. The L-type expert will
deviate and misreport the signal s = 1 if and only if
ppi
ppi + (1− p)(1− pi)
r
r + (1− r)p <
r
r + (1− r)[ pi1−pi (1− p) + p]
The above is equivalent to (
pi
1− pi
)2
< 1 +
r
(1− r)p
The inequality holds for pi ≤ 12 . Therefore, the L-type expert will misreport s = 1 with
positive probability as long as pi is not too much larger than 12 .
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